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EU Counter-terrorism Law:  
What Kind of Exemplar of Transnational Law? 
 
Cian C. MURPHY* 
University of Bristol 
 
Abstract: This article examines counter-terrorism efforts in the EU as it matures as a 
field of law. It sets out three critiques of EU counter-terrorism law: that of 
ineffectiveness, of anti-constitutionalism, and of contrariness to human rights and the 
rule of law.  It considers these critiques in light of the development of policies and 
legal initiatives – against foreign terrorist fighters and against radicalisation. It 
concludes that there are both persistent problems, and some improvements, in the 
law. The EU’s capacity to meet the challenges posed by terrorism and the counter-
terrorism imperative, and how it does so, has global impact. The article concludes 
with an argument for better law-making in the EU to ensure it serves as a better 
exemplar of transnational law. 
 





Since 2013 there have been twenty terrorist attacks with fatalities in Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden, and the UK. These attacks have 
involved cars, vans and hand-held weapons and, in rarer cases, explosives. Europol 
reports that the principal targets of the attacks have been ‘symbols of Western lifestyle’ 
and ‘symbols of authority’, or else ‘indiscriminate’ targets.1 They have included a 
nightclub in Paris, a pop concert in Manchester, and transport hubs, amongst others. 
The resurgence of terrorist activity, as with previous attacks, has led to fresh 
EU law-making. The new centrepiece of the EU legislative response is the Directive 
on Combating Terrorism (DCT).2 The Directive recasts the provisions of the 
Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (FDCT) and adds new measures in 
light of developments in international counter-terrorism co-operation.3 The new 
measures broaden the scope of counter-terrorism law to include the ‘foreign terrorist 
fighter’ as a subject of regulation. The new law also aims to combat ‘radicalisation’ to 
terrorism. Despite the challenges which these new measures raise, the European 
Commission has proposed a Terrorism Regulation to add yet more powers, even 
before it has conducted an assessment of the impact of the Directive.4 The different 
measures entail different degrees of legal integration. The Framework Decision was 
the least integrated of the three types of measure. Directives (for example the Data 
Retention Directive), and regulations (for example those that ground 
                                               
* Some earlier versions of this work were presented in Leiden, The Hague and Santiago de Compostela. I am 
grateful to participants there and to the reviewers and editors for their comments. Errors and eccentricities are 
my own. 
1 Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2018 (Europol, 2018), p. 5. 
2 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating 
terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 
2005/671/JHA [2017] OJ L88/6. 
3 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism [2002] OJ L164/3, 
amended by Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of of 28 November 2008 amending Framework 
Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism [2008] OJ L330/21. 
4 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing 
the dissemination of terrorist content online COM(2018) 640 final, Brussels, 12.9.2018 (‘TOCR Proposal’). 
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sanctions/restrictive measures), have been used before. However, the shift to now use 
a Terrorism Regulation for the next batch of powers is, at least symbolically, 
something of a centralising move. 
The recent additions to EU law and policy is an opportunity to re-evaluate the 
EU’s role in counter-terrorism law. The case studies in this article are laws and policies 
against ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ and ‘radicalisation’. These are related subjects both 
in international law and in EU law and policy. The foreign terrorist fighter is a 
contemporary twist on an older phenomenon: the foreign fighter – an individual who 
travels from their state of nationality or residence to take part in a conflict elsewhere.5 
Because the new term includes the concept of terrorism it is, of course, contestable. 
The concepts of ‘radicalisation’ and ‘counter-radicalisation’ predate the rise in interest 
in foreign terrorist fighters.6 However, even more so than laws on foreign terrorist 
fighters, a legal response to radicalisation is beset with problems of scope and 
definition and remains deeply controversial. The challenges are evident in one 
Member State – the United Kingdom – where the Government has abandoned a 
previous strong commitment to legislate for the related, perhaps co-extensive, field of 
‘counter extremism’ because of the seeming impossibility of a legally robust definition 
of the phenomenon of extremism.7  
Before the FDCT was adopted in the aftermath of the New York and 
Washington DC attacks in 2001, there was no EU counter-terrorism law as such, and 
no literature on the subject.8 A doctrinal and critical literature had begun to emerge by 
the time of the amendments to the Framework Decision in 2008. Now, after almost 
two decades of EU legislation in response to terrorism, there is a rich and growing 
body of research on it and on related fields.9 One consideration for an analysis such as 
this is that it risks the reification of these problematic concepts.10 However, whatever 
is thought of the idea of a ‘foreign terrorist fighter’ or ‘radicalisation’ as legal subjects, 
the response to the phenomena demand examination. Part of that analysis, of 
necessity, is whether it is possible to undertake effective legal action, within the 
constraints of constitutionalism, and with respect for human rights and the rule of 
law.  
This article continues in four parts. Part II provides an overview of EU counter-
terrorism law as it stands today, sets out three critiques of that law, and assesses the 
expansion of legal subjects by the DCT and the Terrorism Regulation proposal. Part 
III considers EU action against foreign terrorist fighters in the context of international 
efforts. Part IV addresses action taken by the EU against radicalisation to terrorism. 
The final part, Part V, re-evaluates the state of play in EU counter-terrorism law. It 
concludes that there are both persistent problems, and some improvements, in the 
law. The EU is the leading exemplar of a transnational legal order. Its capacity to meet 
the challenges posed by terrorism and the counter-terrorism imperative, and how it 
does so, has global impact. 
 
                                               
5 See, for earlier examples, D Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts (OUP, 2013), Chapter 
2; M Donnelly, T M Sanderson and Z Fellman, Foreign Fighters in History (CSIS, 2017). 
6 E Bakker, ‘EU Counter-Radicalisation Policies: A Comprehensive and Consistent Approach?’ (2015) 30(2-3) 
Intelligence and National Security 281, p 288.  
7 ‘Paralysis at the heart of UK counter-extremism policy’ The Guardian 17 September 2017. The UK has, however, 
pursued a new Counter-terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 which addresses, in part, radicalisation. 
8 The principal literature of relevance at that time was in the field of police co-operation and Justice and Home 
Affairs. See M Anderson, M den Boer, P Cullen, W Gilmore, C Raab, and N Walker, Policing the European Union 
(OUP, 1996), and S Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (OUP, first edition 2000, now in its fourth edition, 
2016). 
9 M O’Neill, The Evolving EU Counter-terrorism Legal Framework (Routledge, 2011), as well as several more policy-
specific monographs and articles, referenced infra. 
10 On the challenge of reification of ‘terrorism’ see C Tilly, ‘Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists’, (2004) 22(1) Sociological 
Theory 5. 
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II. EU COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 
 
Terrorism is the pre-eminent example in EU law of a criminal act that is a 
‘supranational public wrong’.11 In doctrinal terms this is because it is the first of ten 
‘Euro-crimes’ for which the EU has an explicit authority to legislate.12 Even before the 
introduction of that explicit legal authority by the Lisbon Treaty, terrorism was the 
subject of a range of laws, institutions, policies and practices at Union level. This law 
transcends several fields of doctrine, including constitutional and administrative law, 
criminal law, procedural co-operation, immigration and asylum law, and external 
relations law. As a response to the 11 September 2001 attacks, it is a creation of the 
current century and so too is its developing literature. This part of the article sets out 
the law, outlines three critiques of EU law in the field, and describes the new wave of 
EU counter-terrorism law in recent years. 
 
A.  The Response to 11 September 2001 
 
The EU response to the 11 September 2001 attacks by Al-Qaeda in New York and 
Washington DC was swift. The attacks had as their target the symbols of US economic 
and political powers – but there were also many European victims – and the attacks 
and their aftermath was seen on live television across Europe.  The need to respond 
was a significant catalyst for co-operation in then-moribund EU criminal law and 
criminal justice.13 This is the ‘counter-terrorism imperative’: the political need to be 
seen to take action in response to terrorist attacks or the threat thereof.  
The initial legislative measures to be agreed at EU level were the FDCT and the 
Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (FDEAW).14 The former was 
later amended, while the latter was joined by a successor measure, the Framework 
Decision on the European Evidence Warrant (FDEEW).15 The FDCT, like all framework 
decisions, is intergovernmental in form. However, with its aim of approximation of 
counter-terrorism offences across Member States, it is somewhat supranational in 
function. It sets out a common definition of terrorism and requires all EU Member 
States to render criminal any behaviour that matches that definition. The FDEAW and 
FDEEW, in contrast, co-ordinate co-operation between national criminal justice 
authorities – they are intergovernmental in both form and function.16 This distinction 
between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism and the shift from the former 
to the latter since the Lisbon Treaty is evidence of an integrative dynamic in this field 
where concerns as to sovereign carry great weight. 
In institutional terms, EU counter-terrorism includes the legislative and 
executive roles of the Parliament, Council, and Commission. The Commission’s role 
has been most significant in some areas, for example in relation to implementation of 
restrictive measures, where it operates lists of individuals subject to asset-freezes and 
travel bans. In the aftermath of the Madrid train bombings in 2004, the office of the 
                                               
11 S Coutts, ‘Supranational Public Wrongs: The Limitations and Possibilities of European Criminal Law and a 
European Community’ (2017) 54 Common Market Law Review 771. 
12 Article 83(1) TFEU. 
13 For a useful map of the field of EU criminal law (and criminal justice) see A Weyembergh and C Brière, ‘EU 
Criminal Law: An expanding field for research, with some uncharted territories’ in A Ripoll Servent and F 
Trauner (eds), The Routledge Handbook of Justice and Home Affairs Research (Routledge, 2017). 
14 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L190/1. 
15 Council Framework Decision 2008/978/JHA of 18 December 2008 on the European evidence warrant for the 
purpose of obtaining objects, documents and data for use in proceedings in criminal matters [2008] OJ L350/72. 
The European Evidence Warrant was later complemented by the European Investigation Order. See Directive 
2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the European Investigation 
Order in criminal matters [2014] OJ L130/1. 
16 See M J Borgers, ‘Implementing Framework Decisions’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1361. 
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EU Counter-terrorism Co-ordinator was established, and agencies and offices such as 
Eurojust, Europol (home to the European Counter Terrorism Centre), INTCEN and 
others have also come to greater prominence.  
In legislative terms, the EU had already adopted supranational counter-
terrorism measures before the new competences provided to it by the Lisbon Treaty. 
These include, in particular, directives to require telecommunications data 
surveillance,17 to further develop financial surveillance,18 and to provide for travel 
surveillance.19 These initial EU efforts used powers to surveil both those under 
suspicion and also the general population of users of financial, telecommunications, 
and travel services. Surveillance measures are a technocratic assemblage whereby 
personal data can be used, either in advance of an attack, or in the aftermath of one, 
to identify individuals against whom to target more intrusive measures. 
If surveillance is the broad net of counter-terrorism policy, the sharp end aims 
to incapacitate those who are held to present a particular threat, such as suspected 
financiers of terrorism. The EU does not have an army or police force. Yet, even with 
its limited role in operational matters, the EU does have enforcement powers, such as 
to ensure financial incapacitation through ‘sanctions’ now known as ‘restrictive 
measures’.20 These laws led to the Kadi litigation saga, which has set down some 
general pronouncements on the EU response to terrorism, and is a foundational case 
in EU Court of Justice (CJEU) case-law.21 Chief amongst these pronouncements is the 
affirmation of the rule of law – both that there must be a legal basis for action against 
terrorism and that any such action is susceptible to robust judicial review. The 
litigation is also a key early contribution of the EU to transnational counter-terrorism 
law – it prompted a change in UN procedures for the listing and delisting individuals 
on global counter-terrorism sanctions lists.22 The Kadi case is the earliest, and still the 
most significant contribution of the EU to the development of transnational counter-
terrorism law. 
Because, however, of the multi-level nature of EU law and governance, within 
Europe EU counter-terrorism law relies on national legislatures for its faithful 
transposition into national law and on national executives and agencies for its 
effective implementation. This has not always led to consistent implementation or 
coherent action. National legislatures have sometimes been either unable or unwilling 
to accurately transpose EU measures into national law. National executives and, in 
particular, agencies, have proven sceptical of the value added by EU co-operation.23 
This reluctance of national authorities is, in part, because counter-terrorism is a ‘high 
                                               
17 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data 
generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services 
or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L105/54. 
18 Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the 
use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation 
(EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC [2015] OJ L141/73. 
19 Directive (EU) 2016/681 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger 
name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and 
serious crime [2016] OJ L119/132. 
20 Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed 
against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, 
and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to 
Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in 
respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan [2002] OJ L139/9. 
21 See C Eckes, ‘EU restrictive measures against natural and legal persons: from counter-terrorist to third country 
sanctions’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 869 and C Eckes, ‘The Law and Practice of EU Sanctions’ 
Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Research Paper No. 2018-01. 
22 L Ginsborg and M Scheinin, ‘You Can’t Always Get What You Want: The Kadi II Conundrum and the Security 
Council 1267 Terrorist Sanctions Regime’ (2011) 8(1) Essex Human Rights Review 7. 
23 On the agencies see M Den Boer, C Hillebrand and A Nölke, ‘Legitimacy Under Pressure: The European Web of 
Counter-terrorism Networks’ (2008) 46(1) Journal of Common Market Studies 101. 
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politics domain’ in which concerns over sovereignty limit co-operation.24 There is 
therefore ongoing tension between the integrative dynamic and the jealous protection 
of sovereign power. 
 
B. Critiques of EU Counter-terrorism Law 
 
Three broad critiques of EU counter-terrorism law and policy can be identified: (i) of 
ineffectiveness; (ii) of anti-constitutionalism; (iii) of contrariness to human rights and 
the rule of law. These critiques are not unrelated. If the law is ineffective, interferences 
with human rights are more difficult to justify and therefore more likely to be 
violations of those rights. Furthermore, compliance with human rights and the rule of 
law is part of constitutionalism. The separate categorisation of human rights and the 
rule of law here is because of the extent of the critiques rather than their analytical 
distinctiveness.  
The question of effectiveness of counter-terrorism is beset with challenges. It is 
difficult to assess the effectiveness of counter-terrorism law because of the secrecy of 
the field.25 Indeed secrecy may even be used as a substitute for proof of efficacy.26 
Counter-terrorism measures, the argument goes, cannot be subject to ordinary tests of 
effectiveness because the evidence of their effectiveness cannot be shared on grounds 
of national security. It must therefore be presumed – a problematic proposition when 
the necessity and proportionality of such measures must be weighed against their 
interference with human rights. 
Insofar as the effectiveness of counter-terrorism can be assessed, legal 
scholarship is in part dependent on other disciplines in the conduct of such 
assessments.27 This is certainly the case in relation to the satisfactory social function of 
legal actors, norms, and processes (analysis of external effectiveness). Such analysis 
relies on disciplines including international relations, security and strategic studies, 
and geography.28 Early assessments of the EU’s contribution by scholars in those fields 
were not positive. EU counter-terrorism efforts were, one analysis claimed, evidence 
that the Union is a ‘paper tiger’ with a ‘prevailing lack of genuine pro-integration 
thinking’ in the field. 29  
It is easier for lawyers to contribute to examinations of the impact of legal 
initiatives on the operation of the legal system and its principles (analysis of internal 
effectiveness).30 In doing so the critique of ineffectiveness overlaps with that of anti-
constitutionalism. This is because principles which ensure internal effectiveness (for 
example that the law is clear, and is given effect to by the executive) also form part of 
the constitutional order. In its analysis of effectiveness, then, this article follows a line 
of ‘law in context’ work which combines insights from other disciplines on external 
effectiveness with legal analysis of internal effectiveness.31  
                                               
24 J Argomaniz, The EU and Counter-terrorism: Politics, polity, and policies after 9/11 (Routledge, 2011), p 8. 
25 K Roach, Comparative Counter-terrorism Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015), p 684 
26 See M deGoede and M Wesseling, ‘Secrecy and security in transatlantic terrorism finance tracking’ (2017) 39(3) 
Journal of European Integration 253. 
27 For an examination of the question of ‘effectiveness’ of counter-terrorism in legal and other contexts, see M 
Vermeulen, D Deering and S McCarthy, Report on Legal Understandings of Impact, Legitimacy & Effectiveness of EU 
Counter-terrorism (SECILE, 2013), and F de Londras, J Doody, J Supe and S Zalkalne Cross-Disciplinary 
Perspectives, on Impact, Legitimacy & Effectiveness in the Context of EU Counter-terrorism (SECILE, 2013). 
28 J Argomaniz, The EU and Counter-terrorism: Politics, polity, and policies after 9/11 (Routledge, 2011); R Bossong, The 
Evolution of EU Counter-terrorism: European Security Policy after 9/11 (Routledge, 2012); O Bures, EU Counter-
terrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger? (Routledge, 2011). 
29 O Bures, ‘EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?’ (2007) 18(1) Terrorism and Political Violence 57 and O 
Bures, ‘EU Counterterrorism Policy: A Paper Tiger?’ (Routledge, 2011). 
30 The distinction is drawn from C McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) Law Quarterly 
Review 632.  
31 See C C Murphy, EU Counter-terrorism Law: Pre-emption and the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing, expanded 
paperback edition, 2015).  
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The critique of anti-constitutionalism holds that, through the adoption of EU 
counter-terrorism measures, the Union acts contrary to its constitutional principles.32 
These principles relate, in particular, to the requirement of a legal basis for legislative 
measures and the division of competence between the EU and its Member States, as 
well as others.  
Two examples illustrate the legal basis point. First, it is arguable that, prior to 
the Lisbon Treaty, the EU did not have the competence to adopt restrictive measures 
against individuals. This argument was raised, unsuccessfully, in the Kadi litigation. 
The CJEU held that a combination of Articles 60, 301, and 308 EC were sufficient legal 
basis.33 The argument of a lack of legal basis before the Lisbon Treaty remains 
persuasive, if now mainly of historical interest.34  
Second, two Member States sought to challenge the Data Retention Directive 
on the ground that it ought to have been adopted as a third pillar measure (such as a 
framework decision) rather than as a Directive under the first pillar.35 The CJEU again 
rejected this argument because, it held, the measure had as its purpose the 
harmonisation of the internal market.  
In both these cases the CJEU used dubious legal basis analysis to facilitate 
counter-terrorism efforts by the EU. Extraordinarily legal measures which test the 
limits of the law don’t only arise in counter-terrorism efforts. EU action in the height 
of the global financial crisis also ran up against the limits of EU treaty competences.36 
States tend to enjoy “extensive responsibility within [their] domain”.37 Where there is 
an emergency, then subject to the requirements of national constitutional law, states 
may arrogate to themselves the necessary powers to act. In contrast, EU competences 
are strictly set out in the EU treaties. Their limits are liable to be tested and 
transgressed in crises – such as in response to terrorism. 
A further lines of analysis relates to the division of competence between the EU 
and its Member States. The distinction between the European level of governance, and 
that of the Member States, came to the fore in Advocaten vor de Wereld.38 The CJEU 
rejected a challenge to the lawfulness of FDEAW brought on the basis of the principle 
of legality. In particular, the challenge was that the 32 offences listed in the FDEAW 
for which the dual criminality requirement was to be abolished were insufficiently 
precise. The Court held that the definition of activity as criminal, under the EAW, was 
for national law and therefore the lack of precision in the EU law was not fatal to its 
legality.39 
In contrast, the UK argued without success in Watson that even if retention of 
telecommunications data by service providers falls within the scope of EU law, the 
terms under which law enforcement officials access that data fall outside EU law’s 
                                               
32 By ‘constitutionalism’ is meant that power is exercised in accordance with ‘a set of norms (rules, principles or 
values) creating, structuring, and possibly defining the limits of, government power or authority’. See W 
Waluchow, ‘Constitutionalism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 20 December 2017, available: < 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism/>. On the general principles of EU law see T Tridimas, The 
General Principles of EU Law, Second Edition (OUP, 2007). 
33 Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, para 236. 
34 By their provision of an explicit legal basis in the Lisbon Treaty, the Member States may give greater credence 
to the claim that prior to the Treaty, such a basis did not exist. The explicit legal basis for restrictive measures is 
found in Article 75 TFEU. However, the EU continues to rely on Article 215 TFEU, despite the former article 
being preferable on both lex specialis and democratic grounds. A contrarian view would be that the clarification of 
a legal basis post-Lisbon does not mean there was not already a legal basis before that Treaty. 
35 Ireland v European Parliament and European Council, C-301/06, EU:C:2009:68. 
36 I am grateful to the editor, Professor Kenneth Armstrong, for bringing this point to my attention. See A 
Hinarejos, “The Euro Area Crisis and Constitutional Limits to Fiscal Integration” (2012) 14 Cambridge Yearbook of 
European Legal Studies 243. 
37 J Raz, “Why the State” in N Roughan and A Halpin (eds), In Pursuit of Pluralism Jurisprudence (CUP, 2017). 
38 Advocaten voor de Wereld, C-303/05,  EU:C:2007:261. 
39 Ibid, paras 48-54. 
forthcoming 2019 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 
 7 
scope.40 The Court held that the fact that the manner in which national authorities 
could access the data was set out in national law did not mean that that law could 
escape the requirement to be compliant with EU law.41  
These cases, like the litigation on legal basis, bolster EU competences in 
counter-terrorism law. We can but speculate as to whether the Court seeks to ensure 
that the Union can be an effective actor against terrorism, or to extend its own role in 
the field (if the EU is competent to act then the Court’s supervisory role also applies), 
or both, or neither. However, regardless of any institutional goal the Court may have, 
the effect of its judgments is to promote the Union’s role, and its own role, in this field.  
 Additional challenges to constitutionalism have arisen in relation to 
agreements between the EU and external partners to enable lawful transatlantic data 
flows. Thus, EU-US PNR Agreements (air travel data), and the EU-US SWIFT 
Agreement (financial transactions data) have been challenged in the EU Court of 
Justice.42 In its most recent judgment on the matter, the CJEU for the first time applied 
the EU Charter to a draft international agreement, and found the draft EU-Canada 
Passenger Name Record Agreement violates the Charter.43 The grounds for the 
judgment were the draft Agreement’s lack of clarity and precision, failures of 
specificity as to data transfer and processing, and the inadequacy of oversight and 
redress mechanisms. The Agreement is now subject to renegotiation. Judgments on 
external relations, by definition, have an impact beyond the EU as they may build the 
EU’s capacity to shape transnational counter-terrorism law. 
The judgments on these external relations matters lie between the critique of 
anti-constitutionalism and the more specific critique of contrariness to human rights 
and the rule of law. It is in this third area that arguments as to EU counter-terrorism 
law have been most robust.44 In terms of human rights, the right to freedom of 
expression, due process rights, right to privacy (including data protection rights), and 
others, have all been the subject of interference. In some cases those rights have been 
found to be violated by the CJEU. For example, in relation to due process and privacy, 
the Court has held EU action to be unlawful in cases such as Kadi and Digital Rights 
Ireland, with consequence for counter-terrorism law in Europe and beyond. The 
alteration of processes in the UN Security Council Al-Qaeda (now Al-Qaeda and 
Islamic State) sanctions regime is one such consequence. The Digital Rights Ireland 
judgment (and its successors) has put the EU at the forefront of developing data 
retention and surveillance standards.   
As for the rule of law, EU counter-terrorism law is vague in its terms, and has 
been impugned as an infringement of the principles of legality (in criminal law) and 
the requirements of accessibility and foreseeability (in law in general).45 A counter-
claim here is that it is not EU law which renders the conduct criminal but national 
law.46 EU law, the counterargument goes, cannot by itself impose criminal law 
obligations upon individuals and relies on transposition to do so. On this view, the 
principle of legality in criminal law applies not at EU level, but at national level.  
The premise is correct, but the argument does not convince. First, the principle 
of legality in criminal law (which can be found in both the ECHR and EU Charter), is 
                                               
40 See Digital Rights Ireland, C-293/12, EU:C:2014:238; Tele2 Sverige and Watson v. GCHQ, Joined Cases C-203/15 
and C-685/15, EU:C:2016:970. 
41 Ibid, paras 62-81. 
42 European Parliament v. Council and European Parliament v. Commission, Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04,  
ECLI:EU:C:2006:346 on the EU-US PNR Agreement; and Council v. in ‘t Veld, C-350/12 P, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2039 
on access to documents in relation to the EU-US Swift Agreements. 
43 Draft agreement between Canada and the European Union on Transfer of Passenger Name Record data, Opinion 1/15, 
EU:C:2017:592. 
44 See in general the work of Statewatch, available at <http://www.statewatch.org>. 
45 See Murphy, n 31 above, pp 227-228. 
46 Coutts, n 11 above. 
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an expression of a broader principle of legal certainty. Even if one accepts the 
relevance of a distinction between EU law which requires criminal liability to be 
imposed and national law which actually imposes criminal liability, that distinction 
cannot allow EU law escape the requirements of legal certainty. It may soften the 
critique but it does not answer it. 
Second, Advocaten voor der Wereld does not call this into question. In that 
judgment, the CJEU rejected a challenge to the FDEAW. The rejected argument was 
that the list of offences exempted from the dual criminality require is too vague. The 
CJEU held that the definition of offences was for national law.47 In the Court’s words, 
the FDEAW ‘does not seek to harmonise the criminal offences in question in respect 
of their constituent elements or of the penalties which they attract…’.48 However, this 
contrasts with the Data Retention Directive – for which the whole basis of EU 
competence is that EU action is preferable to likely divergence in national law if the 
EU did not act.49 Thus, the exercise of competence requires convergent rather than 
divergent law. Vagueness in EU law increases the scope for divergence across 
Member States.  
Third, as a matter of doctrine, the analysis of the CJEU in Digital Rights Ireland 
and in Watson rejects the contention that Union law may mandate coercive action be 
taken and leave the provision of safeguards to national legislatures. The UK has 
argued, without success, that national criminal procedures pursuant to powers given 
by EU law can fall outside the scope of EU law. It is therefore necessary for rule of law 
principles to be upheld at all levels of governance. The importance of this point is 
further emphasised by ongoing developments in EU and UN law on foreign terrorist 
fighters – as we will soon see.  
 
C.  The New Wave of EU Counter-terrorism Laws 
The EU adopted the DCT on 15 March 2017. It shares certain characteristics with early 
EU counter-terrorism law. First, the proposal for the Directive was introduced without 
any prior impact assessment. Second, the proposal was a response to an act of violence 
– the murders in the Bataclan theatre in Paris.50 Third, the proposal is in part a 
legislative response to action by the UN Security Council and by the Council of 
Europe.51 The shift towards supranational legislative forms has implications for the 
effectiveness of the law and its compliance with constitutional principles. These points 
will be returned to in Part V of this article.  
A new legislative process is underway even before completion of the 
Commission’s review of implementation of the DCT. On 12 September 2018, the 
Commission published its proposal for a Terrorism Regulation.52 The proposal relates 
to online terrorist content. The non-governmental organisation, European Digital 
Rights, described it as a ‘tactic’ brought forward under pressure from France and 
                                               
47 Advocaten voor de Wereld ECLI:EU:C:2007:261, C-303/05, paras 48-54. 
48 Ibid, para 52. 
49 See DCT, Preamble, recital 34, amongst other recitals. 
50 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating terrorism and replacing 
Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA on combating terrorism COM/2015/0625 final. 
51 One additional novel aspect is found in Article 24, which provides for the protection of, and provision of 
assistance to, victims of terrorism. Of particular note is the requirement to provide ‘emotional and psychological 
support, such as trauma support and counselling’. It is unclear how Member States are to ensure that the services 
are ‘confidential, free of charge, and easily accessible to all victims of terrorism’. This provision includes what 
could be quite a significant commitment of resources for Member States’ mental health services. Insofar as there 
is new content in the Directive it largely derives from UN Security Council resolution 2178 (SCR 2178). UN Doc 
S/Res/2178 (2014). The Directive sits alongside an Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on 
the Prevention of Terrorism agreed on 22 October 2015. 
52 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing 
the dissemination of terrorist content online COM(2018) 640 final. 
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Germany ahead of the 2019 European Parliament elections.53 The use of Union 
measures for political purposes – rather than to add anything of substance to EU 
counter-terrorism efforts – is itself not new. French President Hollande, in the 
aftermath of the attacks in Paris in 2015, invoked Article 42(7) EU. The High 
Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Federica Mogherini, described the invocation as “a political act, a political message”.54 
It is noteworthy that France did not invoke the solidarity clause in Article 222 TFEU – 
which would have given the European Commission a greater role in the response.  
This critical overview of EU counter-terrorism law, and of critiques of that law, 
demonstrates that the EU undergoes many of the same pressures as states do, in 
particular the ‘counter-terrorism imperative’. The particular constitutional structure 
of the EU makes fulfilment of that imperative difficult, both in terms of political 
agreement on what ought to be done, and how, and in giving legal effect to any such 
agreement. However, insofar as the EU does act, that action may be of greater 
consequence than action taken by any of its Member States.  
A challenge for all critiques of EU law is the claim that they rest upon fallacious 
analogies with either an idealised past or with national law and policy. This challenge 
holds that as the transnationalisation of law progresses, arguments about the character 
of the law ought not assume that absent transnationalisation, the law would be more 
effective, less anti-constitutional, or more respectful of human rights and the rule of 
law. It is not unreasonable to ask whether we expect more from EU counter-terrorism 
law than we would from national law – either today or in the past. There are at least 
three answers.  First, EU law has impact across all Member States. Its greater 
geographic scope increases the number of individuals subject to it and increases the 
significance of the law. Second, multi-level law and legal procedure presents 
particular difficulties for individuals subject to the law and procedure. There is 
therefore a need for greater efforts to preserve the rule of law and vindicate human 
rights. Third, the EU is the pre-eminent example of a transnational legal order. There 
is an onus on the EU to exhibit the values it claims to uphold, not least given rising 
authoritarianism in world politics. 
These points are explored once more below but first it is necessary to consider 
two contemporary policy fields which, once again, broaden the scope of EU counter-
terrorism law: foreign terrorist fighters and radicalisation. 
 
III. FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS AND EU LAW 
 
The contribution of ‘foreign fighters’ to conflicts outside of their own states is not a 
new phenomenon.55 For example, the most well-known foreign fighters in Europe 
since the Second World War were the International Brigades that fought against 
General Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War.56 Furthermore, between 1980 
and 2010, even before the international community began to focus on ‘foreign terrorist 
fighters’, up to 30,000 individuals travelled to conflicts in the Middle East. 57 
Contemporary concern about ‘foreign fighters’, or more commonly ‘foreign 
terrorist fighters’, stems from the increase in travel of fighters to the conflicts in Syria 
and Iraq since 2010. This increase coincided with the seizure of territory across the two 
                                               
53 ‘EU Terrorism Regulation – an EU election tactic’, 12 September 2018, available: https://edri.org/press-release-
eu-terrorism-regulation-an-eu-election-tactic/ 
54 “France invokes EU’s article 42.7, but what does it mean?” The Guardian 17 November 2015. 
55 S Farer, ‘Spain’s Foreign Fighters: The Lincoln Brigade and the Legacy of the Spanish Civil War’ Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 2016. 
56 Ibid. 
57 T Hegghammer, ‘The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad’ (2010/2011) 35(3) 
International Security 53. 
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countries by the organisation known as Islamic State. Islamic State’s claim to establish 
a caliphate drew individuals from across Africa, Europe, and farther afield to join its 
proto-state.58 Motivations for foreign terrorist fighters differ, but include a combination 
of ‘outrage at what is taking place in the country they wish to travel to, adherence to 
the ideology of the group they wish to join, and a search for identity and meaning in 
their personal lives’.59  
The travel of individuals to the conflicts across Iraq and Syria is of concern for 
two reasons. First, such individuals contribute to hostilities in those states and may 
make the conflicts more difficult to resolve. Second, those who have fought on behalf 
of ‘Islamic State’ may return to take action against the states from which they have 
travelled. Europol estimates that approximately 5,000 persons from the EU have 
travelled to Iraq and Syria as foreign terrorist fighters, with 1,500 of those thought to 
have returned to the EU.60 It is concern about the activities of these individuals that has 
triggered related law-making at both UN and EU levels. 
 
A. United Nations Action against Foreign Terrorist Fighters 
The UN Security Council adopted a definition of ‘foreign terrorist fighter’ in SCR 2178, 
agreed at a meeting under US President Barack Obama’s chairmanship on 24 
September 2014.61 The presence of the US President is a marker of the meeting’s 
significance in world politics, which was only the sixth in the Security Council’s 
history to take place at the level of Heads of State and Government. The resolution’s 
definition of foreign terrorist fighter is: 
individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence 
or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or 
preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or 
receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed 
conflict.62 
This definition is broad and is made broader still because of the expanded terminology 
about terrorism that the UN now uses. In 2001, SCR 1373 referred to ‘any act of 
international terrorism’. In 2004, SCR 1566 went further to condemn ‘all acts of 
terrorism irrespective of their motivation, whenever and by whomsoever 
committed’.63 SCR 2178 (2015), and later SCR 2396 (2017), refer to ‘terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations’.64 These later resolutions broaden the scope of UN law. In 
particular, they do not limit their impact to matters of international concern, but also 
include those of national concern, and afford states greater latitude to determine what 
constitutes terrorist behaviour.65  
                                               
58 UN Security Council Counter-terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, The Challenge of Returning and 
Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Research Perspectives (UN, 2018), p 4. 
59 R Frenett and T Silverman, ‘Foreign Fighters: Motivations for Travel to Foreign Conflicts’, in A de Guttry, F 
Capone, and C Paulussen (eds), Foreign Fighters under International Law and Beyond (Springer, 2016), p 63. 
60 Europol, TESAT 2018, p 26. 
61 U.N. Doc. S/Res/2178 (2014). 
62 Ibid, Preamble Recital 9. 
63 U.N. Doc. S/Res/1566 (2004), para 1. Paragraph 3 does include a definition of terrorism offences: ‘criminal acts, 
including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of 
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular 
persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain 
from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions 
and protocols relating to terrorism.’  
64 SCR 2178 does explicitly state that participation in ‘armed conflict’ falls within its scope – something which 
expands rather than limits the definition. 
65 K Ambos, ‘Our terrorists, your terrorists? The UN Security Council urges states to combat ‘foreign terrorist 
fighters’, but does not define ‘terrorism’’ (EJIL: Talk!, 2 October 2014). 
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This tendency to broaden the scope of action is worrisome because the 
resolutions are examples of ‘hegemonic international law’. 66 They are ‘hegemonic’ 
because the use of authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter requires states to 
act, and to legislate for counter-terrorism, in ways they might not otherwise do. The 
subject matter of the resolutions varies. In 2001, SCR 1373 focussed on the financing 
of terrorism.67 In 2005, SCR 1624 addressed incitement to terrorism and border 
controls.68 SCR 2178 continues this trend of mobility restriction. On one view, the effect 
of SCR 2178 is even more dramatic, as ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ themselves might be 
addressees of the resolution. Peters claims that paragraph 1 of the resolution is ‘is the 
legal basis for everyone’s obligation not to commit terrorist acts or participate in the 
armed conflict surrounding [Islamic State]’.69 However, she notes that such an 
interpretation of the resolution, which would directly impose criminal sanctions on 
individuals, would be contrary to the principle of legality. That the imposition of 
obligations on individuals is even arguable is further evidence that the Security 
Council’s action is hegemonic in nature. It suggests the capacity not only to agenda-
set for national legislatures – but to bypass them entirely. Were this to transpire it 
would lend further weight to the argument that constitutional principles must be 
upheld at all levels of governance and not just the national level. 
The transnationalisation of the law is not yet at that point. However, the 
Security Council has assumed an agenda-setting role, and now requires all states to 
adopt a pre-emptive approach to counter-terrorism.70 Foreign terrorist fighters also 
feature in SCR 2253 (2015), which extends the mandate of the Al-Qaeda Sanctions 
Committee to cover Islamic State,71 and in SCR 2395 (2017), on the role of the Counter-
Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) in oversight of implementation 
of UN resolutions and in the promotion of capacity-building for counter-terrorism.72 
The principal successor to SCR 2178 was SCR 2396, adopted on 21 December 2017. The 
resolution reconsiders the threat of foreign terrorist fighters as Islamic State loses 
ground in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. It identifies the increase in likelihood that 
foreign terrorist fighters may become ‘returnees’ – i.e. that they may return to their 
states of origin and pose a security risk.73 Resolution 2396 ‘urges’ states ‘to develop and 
implement appropriate investigative and prosecutorial strategies’ to target foreign 
terrorist fighters.74 These resolutions have been subject to criticism by successive UN 
Special Rapporteurs on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism.75 Nevertheless, the EU law 
largely follows the terms of the UN resolution. 
The EU, of course, is not a member of the UN Security Council, or an addressee 
of its resolutions. Two EU Member States – France and the UK – are not only members 
of the Security Council but are permanent members.76 Article 34 EU requires those 
Member States ‘in the execution of their functions, [to] defend the positions and the 
interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the provisions 
                                               
66 J Alvarez, ‘Hegemonic International Law Revisited’ (2003) 97(4) American Journal of International Law 873. 
67 U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001). For a critique see Alvarez n 62 above, pp 874-878. 
68 U.N. Doc. S/Res/1624 (2005). 
69 A Peters, Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014): The ‘Foreign Terrorist Fighter’ as an International Legal 
Person, Part I (EJIL: Talk!, 20 November 2014). 
70 See C C Murphy, ‘Transnational Counter-terrorism Law: Law, Power and Legitimacy in the “Wars on Terror”’ 
(2015) 6(1) Transnational Legal Theory 31. 
71 U.N. Doc. S/Res/2253 (2015). 
72 U.N. Doc. S/Res/2395 (2017). 
73 U.N. Doc. S/Res/2396 (2017). 
74 U.N. Doc. S/Res/2396 (2017), paragraph 18. 
75 F Ní Aoláin, ‘The UN Security Council, Global Watch Lists, Biometrics, and the Threat to the Rule of Law’ (Just 
Security, 17 January 2018). 
76 Until the purported departure of the UK from the EU on 31 October 2019 after which France will become the 
only such member. 
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of the United Nations Charter’. This puts France and the UK, as well as the 
Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, who currently hold non-permanent seats, under an 
obligation to play an ambassadorial role for EU values in the UN.  
It is difficult to make claims about the extent to which this is being done. It is 
notable that some of the most recent provisions, for example to ‘develop the capacity 
to collect, process and analyse’ Passenger Name Record (PNR) data for counter-
terrorism purposes, are existent EU policies.77 UN counter-terrorism action fits well 
with EU counter-terrorism law and policy – as the analysis of DCT measures on 
foreign terrorist fighters will show. But whether that is a result of advocacy by 
Member States for EU policies, or is merely a consequence of less co-ordinated policy-
laundering, is not clear.  
 
B.  EU Implementation of UN Law on Foreign Terrorist Fighters 
Part of the effect of the DCT is to recast the provisions of the FDCT in a supranational 
measure. The new measures in the law relate in large part to foreign terrorist fighters.  
Recital 5 of the Preamble to the DCT cites EU Member States’ responsibilities to 
implement SCR 2178 as well as the Council of Europe Additional Protocol on foreign 
terrorist fighters.78 The Directive implements several of those obligations. It echoes the 
resolution in its Preamble: 
 
Individuals referred to as ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ travel abroad for 
the purpose of terrorism. Returning foreign terrorist fighters pose a 
heightened security threat to all Member States. Foreign terrorist 
fighters have been linked to recent attacks and plots in several 
Member States. In addition, the Union and its Member States face 
increased threats from individuals who are inspired or instructed by 
terrorist groups abroad but who remain within Europe.79 
 
The provisions of the Directive which most directly address foreign terrorist fighters 
are Articles 9 and 10. Article 9(1) states: 
 
Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that 
travelling to a country other than that Member State for the purpose 
of committing, or contributing to the commission of, a terrorist 
offence as referred to in Article 3, for the purpose of the participation 
in the activities of a terrorist group with knowledge of the fact that 
such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of such a 
group as referred to in Article 4, or for the purpose of the providing 
or receiving of training for terrorism as referred to in Articles 7 and 
8 is punishable as a criminal offence when committed intentionally. 
 
This clause implicates travel when that travel is for any one of three purposes: first, to 
commit or contribute to a terrorist offence; second, to participate in a terrorist group 
with knowledge that this will further the group’s criminal activity; and third, to 
provide or receive training for terrorism. Article 9(2) builds on the former clause to 
require criminalisation either of travel into the Member State for one of the above three 
purposes, or of preparatory acts by a person entering the Member State in relation to 
terrorist offences. Article 10 further widens the net. It requires Member States to ensure 
that ‘any act of organisation or facilitation’ which assists a person in travelling for the 
                                               
77 U.N. Doc. S/Res/2396 (2017), Article 12. 
78 DCT, Preamble, recital 5. 
79 DCT, Preamble, recital 4. 
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purposes of terrorism is a criminal offence. As with the Article 9 offences, the Article 
10 offences require that the behaviour be done ‘intentionally’ to be caught by the 
provision.80 
These articles are problematic. The offences they set out require an act (travel, 
or travel-related behaviour) and a mental state (intention in relation to terrorism or a 
terrorist group). But the act itself does not constitute ‘harm’. Travel by individuals, of 
itself, is not criminal activity. Indeed, the right to leave any country, and to return to 
one’s own country, is set out in Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Further elaboration of the right is found in Article 12(2) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and, in Europe, in Article 2(2) of Protocol No. 
4 to the European Convention on Human Rights. Of course, states may exercise 
powers over their border. However, the existence of a right to travel demonstrates that 
the behavioural element is, without the existence of the mental element, merely the 
exercise of a human right.  
The mental element is, therefore, key to the travel offences. The bar is a low 
one. Intention to commit or to contribute to the commission of a terrorist offence is 
sufficient, but is not necessary, to make out the travel offences. It is also unnecessary 
for any act of terrorism to be carried out. Rather, the full list of intentions, any one of 
which is sufficient, is broad. It includes an intention to commit a range of inchoate acts 
– including intention to further a group’s criminal but not necessarily terrorist 
activities.81 However, while the bar is low, much depends on there being sufficient 
evidence to prove intention to a criminal law standard. Given that the activities in 
question may take place outside the EU or any of its Member States it is not surprising 
that prosecutions have proven difficult.82  
Of course, the existence of offences can be useful, even without prosecutions, 
as they may provide a basis for the use of extraordinary powers by law enforcement 
officials. Thus, where terrorism is suspected, the law may permit greater surveillance, 
or longer pre-trial detention, than where other crimes are suspected. From a rule of 
law point of view, if those powers are dependent on there being a suspicion of 
terrorism, then the use of powers can be limited. However, at EU level, the provision 
of new powers is not necessarily linked to terrorism, at least not as defined in EU law. 
Two examples illustrate the point. First, it is those who commit crimes as defined in 
national law, not EU law, who can be subject to an EAW request.83 Second, individuals 
subject to EU restrictive measures do not have to be under suspicion of a particular – 
or any – terrorist offence. Rather, they must be associated with Al-Qaida, Islamic State, 
or another listed entities.84 In a similar vein, the DCT calls for new offences, and new 
powers, against foreign terrorist fighters, without limiting those powers by reference 
to the definition of terrorism. As such, it is facilitative of executive action, without 
being restrictive of that action, and empowers law enforcement authorities in the EU 
to restrict the mobility of those under suspicion.  
                                               
80 DCT, Article 10. 
81 DCT, Article 9(1). 
82 This has been acknowledged in a summary of research by the UN Counter-terrorism Committee Executive 
Directorate: CTED, The Challenge of Returning and Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Research Perspectives, CTED 
Trends Report, March 2018, p 13: ‘it takes time to develop a brief of evidence; some returnees will not meet the 
required evidentiary threshold, while those that do may only be prosecuted for relatively minor offences, 
meaning that prison sentences imposed on FTFs can be relatively short.’ 
83 Article 2(2) FDEAW provides for surrender for the list of 32 offences ‘as they are defined by the law of the 
issuing Member State’.  
84 Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 of 20 September 2016 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da’esh) 
and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them and repealing Common 
Position 2002/402/CFSP [2016] OJ L255/25; Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1686 of 20 September 2016 imposing 
additional restrictive measures directed against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and natural and legal persons, 
entities or bodies associated with them [2016] OJ L255/1. 
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The focus on mobility of potential terrorists fits with longer-term EU policies. 
Critics have described this approach as on ‘Fortress Europe’.85 These policies are based 
on the idea that, if Europe eliminates internal borders, it must strengthen external 
borders. The Schengen system of border controls has come under new stresses in 
recent years. These stresses have, in part, been brought about as a result of the mass 
displacement of people caused by the conflict in Syria, in particular, as well as 
insecurity across North Africa and the Middle East.86 Concerns that asylum seekers 
from Syria might unwittingly provide cover for foreign terrorist fighters, or other 
combatants, seeking to enter Europe to carry out attacks has led to a new commitment 
to control Europe’s external borders, and even calls for the closing of internal borders.87 
In December 2018, new rules on the Schengen Information System came into force, 
which include obligations to better monitor terrorist activity.88 
The phenomenon of ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ and the threat they pose to 
security in the Europe and elsewhere may be of more limited concern in the future.89 
Some of the offences in the DCT may therefore be redundant, and even if they are not, 
there remains the challenge of successive prosecution. Ultimately, if the focus of 
measures against foreign terrorist fighters is on their exclusion, this only incapacitates 
the individual in relation to one territory and does not prevent them being a threat 
elsewhere. Furthermore, the approach is liable to operational failures, as with the 
return from Libya to the UK of Salman Abedi, responsible for the 2017 Manchester 
bombing.90 Even if the individual is excluded from a territory, they may still pose a 
threat, such as through the radicalisation of others in the territory. It is to this question 
that the analysis next turns. 
 
IV. COUNTER-RADICALISATION AND EU LAW 
 
The term ‘radicalisation’ entered the vernacular in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, 
as policy-makers, academics, and others, sought to understand how individuals are 
drawn into terrorism.91 It has been controversial from the outset – perhaps even more 
so than the term ‘terrorism’. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation 
and Political Violence (ICSR) reports that most ‘definitions currently in circulation 
describe radicalisation as the process (or processes) whereby individuals or groups 
come to approve of and (ultimately) participate in the use of violence for political 
aims’.92 All conceptions of radicalisation consider it to relate to a progression in beliefs, 
but different conceptions have different end-points to that progression. 93  
Efforts to combat radicalisation can be understood by reference to two ideal 
type models: ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘European’.94 Under the Anglo-Saxon model, counter-
radicalisation focuses on behavioural radicalisation (that which is likely to result in 
                                               
85 See N Coleman, ‘From Gulf War to Gulf War - Years of Security Concern in Immigration and Asylum Policies at 
European Level’ in A Baldacinni and E Guild (eds), Terrorism and the Foreigner: A Decade of Tension around the Rule 
of Law in Europe (Brill Publishing, 2006). 
86 See M Ceccorulli, ‘Back to Schengen: the collective securitisation of the EU free-border area’ (2019) 42(2) West 
European Politics 302. 
87 “Extend border controls to counter terror threat, say France and Germany” The Guardian 15 September 2017. 
88 See European Commission, ‘Security Union: new rules on reinforced Schengen Information System enter into 
force’ Brussels 28 December 2018. 
89 See in general UNCTED, The Challenge of Returning and Relocating Foreign Terrorist Fighters: Research Perspectives, 
March 2018. 
90 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, The 2017 Attacks: What Needs to Change? HC1694, 22 
November 2018. 
91 M Sedgwick, ‘The Concept of Radicalisation as a Source of Confusion’ (2010) 22 Terrorism and Political Violence 
479, p. 480. For a review of the term’s use, see P Neumann, ‘Introduction’, in P Neumann and J Stoil (eds), 
Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR, 2008), p 3. 
92 ICSR, Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries (ICSR, 2010), p 12. 
93 P Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalisation’ (2013) 89(4) International Affairs 873, pp 874-875. 
94 Ibid, p. 885. 
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violence) and uses criminal law and criminal justice as its tools. Under the European 
model, counter-radicalisation’s focus is cognitive radicalisation (counter-
constitutionalist thought) and uses a wider range of tools. The conception of 
radicalisation, and the proposition that action should be taken to prevent 
radicalisation, gives rise to tensions with human rights and civil liberties. These are 
the freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of (political) speech, and perhaps 
freedom of association. Thus, even more so than in relation to foreign terrorist fighters, 
counter-radicalisation is a field of action wherein the utility of legal measures is open 
to question. This question has not prevented the EU from adopting such measures. 
The impact of UN law on EU counter-radicalisation is less pronounced that in 
the field of foreign terrorist fighters. Concern about ‘acts of terrorism motivated by 
intolerance or extremism’ has been a feature of UN Security Council resolutions since 
SCR 1373 (2001).95 SCR 1624, adopted in 2005, refers to ‘incitement of terrorist acts 
motivated by extremism and intolerance’.96 Its operative text, Article 1, calls upon 
states to prohibit incitement, to prevent it, and to ‘deny safe haven’ to persons if there 
is ‘credible and relevant information giving serious reasons’ to consider they are 
guilty of it. In 2014, by SCR 2178, the UN took note of the relationship between 
radicalisation, terrorism, and the rise in foreign terrorist fighters. Article 15 of SCR 
2178 ‘underscores’ the importance of ‘countering violent extremism, … including 
preventing radicalization…’. The clause acknowledges the distinction between 
radicalisation and recruitment, and indeed also between those two activities, and 
mobilization. It does not, however, define any of the terms. Nevertheless, the 
provision does not carry the same requirement of mandatory action as articles 5, 6, 
and 8, which address foreign terrorist fighters, and the financing of terrorism. Rather, 
article 15 and the other articles which explicitly address radicalisation, are 
recommendatory in nature.  
 
A. Counter-Radicalisation and the EU 
EU policies on radicalisation date to the aftermath of the attacks in Madrid and 
London.97 The EU is a useful context in which to study counter-radicalisation because 
different Member States take different approaches and so the EU is under the 
influence of both ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘European’ models. EU policies entail consists of 
successive, overlapping, documents from both the Council (in particular under Dutch 
and British Presidencies) and the Commission.98 In 2004, the Commission published a 
Communication which included the term ‘violent radicalisation’,99 even as it sought to 
stress the distinction between radical thought and terrorism. It published a further 
Communication a year later, after the London attacks. These Commission 
communications relied upon the EU’s capacity to facilitate the exchange of expertise 
as a principal contribution to the field. The 2005 EU Counter-terrorism Strategy and 
EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation both address the subject.100 These strategies 
have been updated several times sit alongside broader EU security and external 
relations policies.101 Thus, radicalisation features in the Hague Programme (2004) and 
                                               
95 U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001), Preamble, recital 6. 
96 U.N. Doc. S/Res/1624 (2005), Preamble, recital 5. 
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98 Bossong, n 97 above, pp 67-70. 
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100 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament 
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in the Stockholm Programme (2009) with objectives and policies for the ‘area of 
freedom, security, and justice’.102 
In 2013, Council conclusions called upon the Commission to develop a new 
communication on counter-radicalisation. The Commission’s reply came in 2014.103 The 
Communication emphasises, even in its title, a link between radicalisation and 
violence: ‘Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism’. It refers to 
‘a larger variety of ideologies’ which inspire terrorism in Europe, including 
‘nationalist and separatist ideologies, those inspired by Al-Qaida, violent left-wing, 
anarchist, and right-wing ideologies’.104 The Communication notes that 
‘comprehensive approaches’ under the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy’ are ‘not 
widely used’.105 It also claims that ‘effective prevention means involving non-
governmental organisations, front line workers, security services, and experts in the 
field’.106 Front line workers are said to include ‘social workers, educators, healthcare 
workers, police, prison staff, and probation staff’.107 The Communication distinguishes 
between disengagement, in which the individual renounces violence but not ‘the 
ideology underpinning it’, and de-radicalisation, in which the individual renounces 
both.108 
The Communication reads more like an à la carte menu from which Member 
States are encouraged to choose different policy elements rather than a coherent 
strategy. It relies upon different conceptions of radicalisation: ‘increasingly 
reactionary and extremist views in other parts of society’;109 and ‘radicalisation leading 
to extremist violence’.110  It is not surprising, therefore, that from the outset it was 
criticised because of ‘an absence of priorities and realistic objectives’.111 The EU policy 
documents demonstrate that the Union mixes both the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and the 
‘European’ models.112 However, these policy compromises becomes problematic when 
one considers the prospect of ‘trade-offs’ between the models such that combination 
of both approaches by the EU may be counter-productive.113 
In institutional terms, the Council and Commission have been in the lead in the 
development of EU policy. In 2013 the Commission established the Radicalisation 
Awareness Network Centre of Excellence (RAN), which describes itself as ‘a network 
of frontline or grassroots practitioners from around Europe who work daily with 
people who have already been radicalised, or who are vulnerable to radicalisation’.114 
In 2017 it further established a High-Level Expert Group on Radicalisation, with a 
mandate to give advice on stakeholder co-operation and collaboration, policy 
development, and ‘more structured co-operation mechanisms’. The group’s work 
concluded in 2018 with the presentation of its final report. The limitations of the 
Commission’s approach have been laid bare by the EU Court of Auditors.115 The report, 
in plain but damning language, observes: ‘the achievements of specific actions are 
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often measured in terms of amount of activity rather than effectiveness’.116 This is 
suggestive of a hamster in a wheel: no matter how much effort is spent it remains in 
the same place. The Commission is recommended to ‘improve the framework for 
overall coordination of actions addressing radicalisation; increase practical support to 
practitioners and policymakers in Member States; and improve the framework for 
assessing results.’  
 
B. EU Legislation to Combat Radicalisation 
The contribution of EU law to EU counter-radicalisation, prior to the DCT and 
Terrorism Regulation Proposal,  can be said to encompass speech offences, other 
inchoate offences, and surveillance provisions. As the analysis moves from specific 
offences to broader provisions, for example on surveillance, we move further from 
counter-radicalisation into general counter-terrorism policy.  
An early legal element to the EU’s efforts to combat radicalisation is found in 
the 2008 amendment to the FDCT. The FDCT already had an offence of incitement of 
terrorism, in its Article 4(1).117 However, prior to the adoption of the amending 
legislation, the European Commission had raised concerns about the absence of a 
definition of ‘incitement’ in the FDCT, as well as the absence of any common concept 
of incitement in Member State laws.118 In addition, after the adoption of the FDCT, 
requirements to criminalise incitement of terrorism were included in SCR 1624 (2005) 
and the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.119 The 
amendments to the FDCT included the introduction of a new offence, ‘provocation of 
terrorism’, to address the perceived gap in the law. The definition of the offence in the 
FDCT, as amended, did not include any explicit reference to the internet, even though 
it was of concern. 
The FDCT also provides for a range of broader inchoate offences. These are the 
giving and the receipt of training for terrorism,120 aiding or abetting terrorism,121 the 
attempt of (most) terrorist offences.122 The offences are all measures which could be 
deployed to prevent activity that might otherwise radicalise individuals. Their 
particular focus is not radicalisation per se but the broader prevention of terrorism.  
Surveillance of the general population – in their travel, financial transactions, 
and telecommunications – may also contribute to counter-radicalisation operations. 
Although all of these aspects of counter-terrorism law may have relevance, 
telecommunications surveillance is most relevant, as it provides a means to surveil 
communications between individuals. The Data Retention Directive required Member 
States to have telecommunications service providers retain information on telephone 
calls made and web services accessed.123 The CJEU has held the Directive unlawful but 
several Member States continue to pursue legislation for this purpose.124 
Furthermore, the UK has proposed domestic policies that would go further. In 
the aftermath of revelations from Edward Snowden and others about general 
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surveillance of communications, service providers have sought to assure their users 
as to privacy, in particular through encryption of communications. This has led to calls 
for the forcible decryption of communications at the request of law enforcement 
agencies.125 A legal basis for forcible decryption may already exist in UK law, in the 
guise of ‘technical capabilities notices’.126 However, no such power has, as of yet, found 
its way into EU legislation.  
It is now is public speech rather than private communication that EU counter-
radicalisation law targets. The principal parts of the DCT that address radicalisation 
(albeit not always in explicit terms) are found in Article 5 (provocation of terrorism), 
Article 14 (incitement and other inchoate offences), and Article 21 (online content). 
Article 21(1) sets out that: 
 
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure the 
prompt removal of online content constituting a public 
provocation to commit a terrorist offence, as referred to in Article 
5, that is hosted in their territory. They shall also endeavour to 
obtain the removal of such content hosted outside their territory. 
 
Member States may also take measures to block access to such content, subject to 
safeguards.127 The Terrorism Regulation Proposal would entail additional obligations 
on online content. It proposes to ‘to prevent the misuse of hosting services for the 
dissemination of terrorist content online’.128 It would provide law enforcement officials 
across the EU with several powers in relation to online content. First, they would be 
able to issue a ‘removal order’, to require an internet hosting service provider to 
remove content within one hour. Second, they would be able to refer hosted material 
to hosting service providers for review under the provider’s own terms and 
conditions. And, in addition, hosting service providers would be required to take 
‘proactive measures’ to remove terrorist material, including with the use of ‘automated 
detection tools’.129  
EU legal measures – both existent and proposed – to combat radicalisation 
continues to expand the regulatory scope of counter-terrorism law. Just as the focus 
on foreign terrorist fighters proposes to further control the mobility of persons, a focus 
on radicalisation purports to control to availability of information in public and 
private spheres. In doing so it grants authorities greater capabilities to surveil the 
population and incapacitate certain targets.  
 
V. EU COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW: EUROPE & BEYOND 
 
The expansion of EU counter-terrorism law is in part reflective of similar expansions 
in UN law. Where it is, for example on foreign terrorist fighters, it shares some of the 
flaws of the global measures. In other areas, for example radicalisation, intra-EU 
policy dynamics may be more influential, and there is incoherence in EU policies. This 
section concludes the analysis in two parts. First, it re-examines the three critiques of 
EU counter-terrorism law, in light of the adoption of new laws and policies against 
foreign terrorist fighters and radicalisation. The conclusion here is that, for all of the 
new initiatives, much stays the same. Second, it considers the future of the EU in 
transnational counter-terrorism efforts. Here, the analysis draws together the threads 
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from the previous parts of this article, to suggest that there remains potential for the 
EU to better use its position to advocate for better law.  
The shift towards the use of a Directive (and in the future a Regulation) has 
some impact, albeit not a dramatic one, on the ongoing salience of the three critiques 
of EU counter-terrorism law. The internal effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism law 
is likely to be stronger than it was when the principal measure was the FDCT. The 
DCT, as a measure adopted upon the legal bases of Article 83(1) and Article 82(2) 
TFEU, benefits from the full enforcement mechanisms and procedures that the 
European Commission and the CJEU can bring to bear. For those Member States to 
whom the adopted Directive applies, there will be the prospect of enforcement 
proceedings in the case of tardy or inaccurate transposition. The first step in relation 
to the DCT will be a review by the Commission, which is due to report to the Council 
and the Parliament by 8 March 2020 on implementation of the Directive, and then 
again by 8 September 2021 on the Directive’s ‘added value’.130 It remains to be seen 
whether this review is done, and done well, as several previous measures have 
included review clauses which have gone without implementation.131 Nevertheless, the 
content of the Directive is rather broad so it is not clear what satisfactory transposition 
of some measures would entail. The Commission and CJEU, in their enforcement 
efforts, will have much discretion to decide whether or not it considers a particular 
state’s transposition to be appropriate. The same is true of the Terrorism Regulation 
which, if promulgated, will not only be a supranational measure but will enjoy direct 
applicability in all EU Member States – there will not necessarily be any need for 
national measures for it to take effect. 
 The internal and external effectiveness of the DCT is limited by the opt-outs by 
three Member States: Denmark,132 Ireland, and the UK.133 Denmark and Ireland remain 
bound by the Framework Decision but do not participate in the DCT. The Directive 
and the Framework Decision are not, by and large, very different. As such, the 
application of the former by Denmark and Ireland is not likely to result in significant 
divergence in the law across the Member States. The UK’s 2014 opt-out from criminal 
justice co-operation included an opt-out from the FDCT and so the UK is not bound 
by the FDCT or the DCT.134 Furthermore, the departure of the UK from the EU leaves 
its participation in EU counter-terrorism law, policy, and operations, subject to 
renegotiation. 135 The UK and Ireland’s refusal to opt-in, despite their adoption of 
measures to implement the underlying SCR 2178, and Denmark’s general opt-out in 
this field, indicates a degree of scepticism about – or outright opposition to – EU law 
against terrorism. The UK government, in justifying its decision not to opt-in to a 
Council Decision on EU participation in the Council of Europe Convention and 
Additional Protocol on the Prevention of Terrorism, states: 
The long-standing approach of the UK Government is that it 
would not be in the national interest to do anything which could 
bind us to an exercise of EU competence in relation to counter-
terrorism which could limit our future ability to act independently 
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on terrorism legislation; or which could grant the Court of Justice 
of the European Union jurisdiction over national security matters 
in relation to the UK.136 
 
This statement makes clear that the impact of EU laws and policies is not only to 
provide ‘added value’ but also to empower EU institutions as an actor in this field. 
 There has been less change in relation to the critiques of anti-constitutionalism 
and of contrariness to human rights and the rule of law. In terms of constitutionalism, 
EU legal authority in this field is on a more sound footing after the agreement and 
coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. There are now more explicit legal bases to 
legislate for counter-terrorism than in the past. Thus, whereas before it was possible 
to criticise EU counter-terrorism law for being contrary to the principle of legality 
insofar as there was not a legal basis for its acts, that criticism is much less severe 
today. Furthermore, the Commission and CJEU enforcement powers raise the 
prospect of more rule of law compliance in EU counter-terrorism law as the DCT is 
transposed across the EU. The same will be the case of the Terrorism Regulation (if 
adopted). The division of competences remains a point of tension between the EU and 
its Member States. Arguments about opt-outs in counter-terrorism law are proxies for 
wider arguments over the appropriate scope of EU authority. This is evident in the 
UK consideration of whether or not to join the EU’s participation in the Council of 
Europe Additional Protocol.  
Despite progress in terms of legal authority, rule of law concerns and human 
rights protection issues persist. Central to these problems is the lack of clarity and 
precision in the law. The DCT relies on a broad definition of ‘terrorism’. Beyond the 
question of certainty – the broader critique of contrariness to human rights remain. 
The safeguards in the DCT, as with the FDCT, are largely in the (non-binding) 
Preamble rather than the (binding) substantive text. For example, recital 10 to the 
Preamble proposes the following limitations on the offence of provocation of 
terrorism. First, the conduct should be punishable ‘when it causes a danger that 
terrorist acts may be committed’. In a determination as to whether that is the case, the 
‘specific circumstances’ of a case should be taken into account. These circumstances 
include ‘the author and the addressee of the message, as well as the context in which 
the act is committed’. Consideration is also to be given to ‘the significance and the 
credible nature of the danger’.137 These provisions, if given effect, would narrow the 
gap between an act of provocation and potential harm. The Commission’s 
responsibility to consider the Directive’s impact on human rights is therefore a 
significant one.138  
The exercise of EU competence has political and legal ramifications. In political 
terms, it marks out the EU as an actor in counter-terrorism at regional and global level. 
In legal terms, Member States are ‘within the scope of EU law’139 when they act in 
relation to (at least some) counter-terrorism law, the CJEU has jurisdiction over the 
interpretation of the law, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights is applicable. EU 
counter-terrorism law therefore establishes and perpetuates soft power for the Union 
in counter-terrorism policy. The critiques of EU counter-terrorism law draw attention 
to ways in which that power can be better used.  
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The adoption of the DCT in response to an attack suggests that EU law-making 
remains crisis driven. If the Commission dispenses with impact assessments when it 
brings forward legislative proposals then it brings into question not only the rule of 
law as a legal principle but also the rule of law as a political value. In a similar vein 
are criticisms of the Terrorism Regulation Proposal as political opportunism ahead of 
European elections. The need for prior assessment of counter-terrorism proposals and 
review after implementation is acknowledged as a key part of a robust policy process 
in counter-terrorism.140 EU institutions cannot overlook the ways in which measures 
which rely heavily on discretion could be used to suppress political dissent in states 
with weak rule of law safeguards. As EU Commissioner for Trade, Celia Malmstrom, 
argued in another context: ‘We want to shape globalisation, not to be shaped by it. It’s 
not only goods and services that we export through open global trade. It is our values 
and standards – sharing and enforcing them is a critical part of our response to 
globalisation.’ 141  
If the EU is growing as a developer of counter-terrorism policies then it must 
uphold its values. Several steps could be taken to do so. First, the EU could devise 
policies and adopt laws in accordance with processes which contain adequate 
mechanisms for ex ante and ex post scrutiny. This requires both prior impact 
assessments and implementation reviews. Second, the Union could ensure that, where 
policies require legislation, principles of constitutionalism, human rights protection, 
and the rule of law, are concerns at all levels of governance. This would entail not only 
robust judicial review by the CJEU but also the careful drafting of legislation in the 
first place so that EU rules model good practice from the outset of the rule-making 
and rule-enforcement process. Third, EU Member States could use their influence in 
other organisations, such as the UN, to promote these good practices across the globe. 
In doing so the EU would better live up to its potential as an exemplar of transnational 
law. 
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